


The Cyber Security Modeling Language and

Cyber Security research at department for Industrial Information and Control Systems

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KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm





Agenda

Dept. for Industrial Information and Control Systems, KTH

Cyber Security Modeling Language (CySeMoL)

Areas for collaboration / exchange



Industrial Information and Control Systems

Research

- Focus is on developing theories, methods and prototypes in order to contribute to the development of cost-effective and resilient industrial ITsystems
- In particular for electric power utilities the department has ever since its start in 1989 had a close cooperation with the power industry.
- Research groups
 - Power System Mamagment with related Information Exchange
 - Information and Control Systems Architecture
 - Cyber Security
 - Technology Management

Size

• approximately 30 people out of which 5 faculty



Cyber Security @

Industrial Information and Control Systems

Research areas

- Security analysis of enterprise-level information systems architectures (user/customerside system architectures)
- In particular for power utilites (i.e. SCADA and substation automation systems, and smart grid architectures)
- Information Security Managment (security governance and organization)

Methodolodigal approach

- Information systems architecture modelling
- Attack/defense graphs
- Probabilistic analyses

People

• 3 faculty, 3 PhD students (1 industry),1 post doc (upstarting) +1, 1 programmer

Projects/financing

- EU FP7: VIKING finished (security of "traditional" SCADA)
- EU FP7: SEGRID (smart power grid cyber security)
- EU ERA-NET: SALVAGE (smart low-voltage power grid cyber security)
- Swedish Centre for Smart Grids and Energy Storage
- Swedish National Grid/ Swedish Defence Research Agency
- European Institute of Innvation and Technology / InnoEnergy (comersialization)



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Cyber security managment is difficult!

Is my control system secure enough? Interconnected


Complex architecture and data flow

Many vendors (incl. off-the-shelf components)

Office LAN




CISO(etc.)



Which parameters decides cyber security?

PLC







In practice, cyber security management and design has limited resources

Should I spend my budget on: a training program for my staff, logging functionality, or network scanning?






Cyber Security Modeling Language (CySeMoL) in summary


An "IT Auto-CAD Tool"


- User draws maps of IT architecture components/assets and their connections (current or future).
- Tool provides a "heat map" of how secure or vulnerable different parts of an IT architecture are towards cyber attacks
- The tool simulates hacker attacks and assesses risks in architecture components/assets through combining user input on system properties with built-in security expertise.





CySeMoL screen shot – attack success





CySeMoL screen shot – attack success in detail

Windows XP SP3

DevelopExploitForPublicUng

FindPublicExploitForPublicPatchableV

FindPublicPatchableVulnerability FindPublicUnpatchableVulnerabilit CatProductInformation

HasNoUnpatchableVulnerabilit

urceCodeSecret

WrittenOnlyInSafeL

mprovedWithStaticCodeAnalys

<Oper

ASLR

OSProduct

Isolated system

AntiMalwareInstalled

ExecutableSpaceP

aticARPTables

AccessThroughPor

AccessThroughUI

ExecuteArbitraryCode

FindUnknownService

ExecuteMaliciousPayload

DenialOfService

FindExploit

HasAllPatches

HostFirewall

USBAutoRunD

ARPSpoot

Access

FindPublicExploitForPublicUnpatchable


DevelopZeroDavExploit

BinarySecret HasBeenScrutinized HasNoPatchableVulnerabilit

(same system model but each attack step visualized individually)




The underlying magic: Attack / defense graphs




Bayesian networks






Bayesian networks







Attacks and defenses – relation to assets





Studies/topics covered by CySeMoL

Attacks/malicious activities:

- Zero-day discovery
- Memory corruption exploitation
- Web application exploitation (XSS, RFI, SQLi, Command injection)
- Social engineering
- Code injection using removable media
- Password guessing (online/offline)
- Denial of service
- Man-in-the-middle
- Discovery of unknown entry-points
- ...

Includes 59 attack steps



Studies/topics covered by CySeMoL

Defenses

- Network intrusion detection systems
 - Both detection and prevention-based
- Host intrusion detection systems
- Web application firewalls
- Anti-malware
- Firewalls
- Security training
- Encryption
- Software development best practice methods
- Network management (e.g., scanning, USB policy, etc)
- .

Includes 58 defense types



Studies/topics covered by CySeMoL

Assets

- IT services
- Software components
- Operating systems
- Communication networks
- Users
- User accounts
- Data flow
- Protocols
- ...

23 asset types, 51 system relations types



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Areas for collaboration / exchange

Attack graphs, attack graphs, attack graphs...

- Refine attacks
- Expand attacks in "novel" areas
- Specialize for smart grids
- Automatic modeling / data collection
- Automatic design

In an academic setting or in a start-up company



Thank you for listening

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More info www.ics.kth.se/cysemol