

## Secure and Privacy Preserving Biometrics for Online Authentication

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#### **Outline**

- Motivation and goals
- Research Questions
- Traditional Biometric Authentication
- eIDAS
- FIDO
- Biometric Transaction Authentication Protocol
- Challenges



## **Motivation and goals**

- The motivation for the project is to enable biometric authentication of users and verification of transactions in online banking.
- Make online banking more convenient for users
- Using smartphones as biometric sensors
- Directive on Payment Services (PSD2) adopted by the European Parliament Oct. 2015. (Directive (EU) 2015/2366)



### **Research Questions**

- 1. What are the challenges with using biometric enabled transaction authentication protocols in online banking and e-services?
- 2. Can existing biometric transaction authentication protocols be used on smartphones with lower computational capability?
- 3. What are the challenges posed by privacy preserving biometrics in achieving robust biometric transaction authentication protocols?




### **Research Questions**

- 4. Can built-in biometric sensors (e.g. fingerprint sensor in iPhone) be used with biometric transaction authentication protocols?
- 5. Can we improve the trustworthiness of existing biometric transaction authentication protocol against indirect attacks?



#### **Traditional Biometric Authentication**





#### **Traditional Biometric Authentication**

 The owner of the system have more control over the different aspects (sensors, enrollment, database)

#### But:

- Need to maintain a centralized database with sensitive biometric information (high value target)
- Biometric data must be transmitted over the network




### State-of-the-art

- Biometric authentication performed locally using a smartphones or mobile devices as the biometric sensor
- Pseudonymous identifier (PI) for remote verification
- Biometric template protection to secure biometric data incase of data breaches (one way transformation / key binding)



## Biometrics and Electronic Identity (eID)



Buchmann, Nicolas, et al. "Towards electronic identification and trusted services for biometric authenticated transactions in the single euro payments area."




## **Biometrics and Electronic Identity**

- Electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market
- Biometric Authenticated Connection Establishment (BioPACE)
- Replace password with PI generated from biometric



## Fast IDentity Online Alliance (FIDO)






## Biometric Transaction Authentication Protocol (BTAP)

- Add biometric factor to the transaction
- Similar security to token based systems
- Enables non-repudiation
- Biometric template protection



#### **BTAP** entities

- Banking software on client computer
  - Potentially vulnerable
- Biometric transaction device
  - Assumed to be secure
- Online Banking Server
  - Communicates with client and BTD






## Transaction Authentication protocol

 Transaction order record (TOR)

- 1. Transaction id
- 2. Sender id
- 3. Receiver id
- 4. Amount
- Transaction order seal (TOS)
  - Message Authentication Code
- TOS recreated on server





## **Banking Server**

- Enrolment protocol:
  - 1. Generate unique secret
  - 2. Communicated to BTD
  - 3. Secret stored as hash value
- Transaction Authentication Protocol
  - 1. Receives TOR from client
  - 2. Receives TOS from BTD
  - 3. Recreates TOS using TOR and hashed secret
  - 4. Transaction verified if and only if both TOS are equal



#### **Biometric Transaction device**

- Enrolment protocol
  - 1. Receives secret from banking server
  - 2. Acquire biometric data from user
  - 3. Calculate auxiliary data from secret and biometric data
  - 4. Non sensitive auxiliary data stored on the device



#### **Biometric Transaction Device**


- Transaction Authentication Protocol
  - 1. Receive TOR from banking software
  - 2. Recapture biometric data from user
  - 3. Recreate secret key from biometric data and stored auxiliary data
  - 4. Use hashed secret key to seal TOR
  - 5. Communicate TOS to online banking server



## Biometric transaction authentication protocol (BTAP)


Transaction data communicated from client to biometric transaction device And banking server

Transaction verified on server using pseudonymous identifier





## **Practical Implementation**





## Challenges

- How was the user enrolled in the system?
- Acquire samples conveniently with good quality
- Securing the biometric data to protect the privacy of the users without loss of accuracy
- Communicating the result of biometric authentication result remote location



## Thanks for your attention!

# Questions?



#### **Citations**

- 1. Buchmann, Nicolas, et al. "Towards electronic identification and trusted services for biometric authenticated transactions in the single euro payments area." *Privacy Technologies and Policy*. Springer International Publishing, 2014. 172-190.
- 2. Hartung, Daniel, and Christoph Busch. "Biometric transaction authentication protocol: Formal model verification and "Four-eyes" principle extension." *Financial Cryptography and Data Security*. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011. 88-103.