# E-Voting with Commitments


Thor Tunge

May 11, 2019


Thor Tunge E-Voting with Commitments

- Voting model
- Shuffling votes
- Proof of shuffling
- Add commitments

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
- Ordered set of messages as input
- (Permuted) ordered set as output
- Proof that  $\hat{m}_i = m_{\pi(i)}$



- Ordered set of messages as input
- (Permuted) ordered set as output
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A cheating  $\mathcal{P}$  wants to change a message  $m_k$  such that no permutation exists


$$\pi:(m_i)_1^n\to (\hat{m}_i)_1^n$$



- Public:  $(\hat{m}_i)_1^n$  and  $(m_i)_1^n$
- Secret: Permutation  $\pi$
- $\bullet$  Will create an interactive protocol between  ${\cal P}$  and  ${\cal V}$

#### Intermezzo: Polynomials

- Pick two polynomials  $f, \hat{f}$  at random (of degree n)
- Pick a random number  $\rho$
- How likely is  $f(\rho) = \hat{f}(\rho)$



$$f(\rho) - \hat{f}(\rho) = 0 \Rightarrow f = \hat{f}$$



- Define  $f(X) = \prod (m_i X)$ ,  $\hat{f}(X) = \prod (\hat{m}_i X)$
- Construct linear system where solution exists if

$$f(\rho) - \hat{f}(\rho) = 0$$

 $\bullet\,$  Require that  ${\cal P}$  provides a solution

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$$f(\rho) - \hat{f}(\rho) = 0$$

- Require that  $\mathcal P$  provides a solution
- ${\mathcal P}$  proves that they know  $\pi$  to a verifier  ${\mathcal V}$

Notation: 
$$M_i = m_i - \rho$$
 and  $\hat{M}_i = \hat{m}_i - \rho$ 

- $\textcircled{O} \ \mathcal{V} \ \text{picks a random } \rho$
- **2** Both compute  $M_i$  and  $\hat{M}_i$
- **③**  $\mathcal{P}$  picks random  $(\theta_i)_1^{n-1}$  and computes  $\theta_{k-1}M_k + \theta_k \hat{M}_k$
- $\mathcal{P}$  sends  $\theta_{k-1}M_k + \theta_k \hat{M}_k$  to  $\mathcal{V}$
- ${\small \textcircled{0}} \hspace{0.1 cm} \mathcal{V} \hspace{0.1 cm} \text{sends a challenge } \beta$
- **(**)  $\mathcal{P}$  has to determine  $s_i$

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$$\beta M_1 + s_1 \hat{M}_1 = \theta_1 \hat{M}_1$$
  
$$s_1 M_2 + s_2 \hat{M}_2 = \theta_1 M_2 + \theta_2 \hat{M}_2$$

$$s_{n-2}M_{n-1} + s_{n-1}\hat{M}_{n-1} = \theta_{n-2}M_{n-2} + \theta_{n-1}\hat{M}_{n-1}$$
$$(-1)^n\beta\hat{M}_n + s_{n-1}M_n = \theta_{n-1}M_n$$

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$$s_{1}\hat{M}_{1} = \theta_{1}\hat{M}_{1}$$

$$s_{1}M_{2} + s_{2}\hat{M}_{2} = \theta_{1}M_{2} + \theta_{2}\hat{M}_{2}$$

$$\vdots$$


$$s_{n-2}M_{n-1} + s_{n-1}\hat{M}_{n-1} = \theta_{n-2}M_{n-2} + \theta_{n-1}\hat{M}_{n-1}$$

$$s_{n-1}M_{n} = \theta_{n-1}M_{n}$$

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
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
Ms = b

is a  $n \times (n-1)$  system of linear equations. Over-determined.


Want to show that **b** is in the span of **M** if shuffle is done correctly.



• Square  $n \times n$  matrix




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- **M** has linearly independent vectors


• det
$$(\boldsymbol{b}||\boldsymbol{M}) = \beta \left(\prod_{i=1}^{n} M_{i} - \prod_{i=1}^{n} \hat{M}_{i}\right) = \beta(f(\rho) - \hat{f}(\rho))$$




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
•  $\det(\boldsymbol{b}||\boldsymbol{M}) = 0 \iff \boldsymbol{b}$  in the span of  $\boldsymbol{M}$ 



• This system has a solution iff  $f(\rho) = \hat{f}(\rho)$ 




- This system has a solution iff  $f(\rho) = \hat{f}(\rho)$
- Shuffle done honestly  $\Rightarrow f(X) = \hat{f}(X) \Rightarrow f(\rho) = \hat{f}(\rho)$




- This system has a solution iff  $f(\rho) = \hat{f}(\rho)$
- Shuffle done honestly  $\Rightarrow f(X) = \hat{f}(X) \Rightarrow f(\rho) = \hat{f}(\rho)$
- If permutation does not exist  $\Rightarrow f(\rho) = \hat{f}(\rho)$  negligible

- ${\mathcal V}$  picks a random  $\rho {\rightarrow}$
- Both compute  $\hat{M}_i = \hat{m}_i 
  ho$ ,  $\mathcal{P}$  computes  $M_i = m_i 
  ho$
- $\mathcal{P}$  picks  $\theta_i$  and computes  $\theta_{k-1}M_k + \theta_k\hat{M}_k \rightarrow$
- $\mathcal V$  picks a challenge  $\beta \rightarrow$
- ${\mathcal P}$  solves linear system ightarrow
- $\mathcal V$  verifies the linear system

## Problem: The Whole Picture




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- 3 algorithms: Keygen, Commit, Verify
- Commit to a value *m* using randomness *r*:

$$Commit(m, r) := [m; r]$$

- Send commitment [*m*; *r*].
- Later, reveal (m, r) by sending it
- Verifier can check that [m; r] = Commit(m, r)

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
$$Commit(m, r) := [m; r]$$

- Send commitment [*m*; *r*].
- Later, reveal (m, r) by sending it
- Verifier can check that [m; r] = Commit(m, r)
- Hiding Verifier cannot open before (m, r) is sent.
- Binding Prover cannot send different (m', r') such that

$$\texttt{Commit}(m',r') = \texttt{Commit}(m,r) \quad m \neq m'$$

# Solution: Commitments!

Add commitments to the picture!



Public:  $([m])_1^n$  and  $(\hat{m})_1^n$ Secret: permutation  $\pi$   $\checkmark \mathcal{V} \text{ picks a random } \rho \rightarrow$   $\checkmark \text{ Both compute } \hat{M}_i \text{ and } \hat{M}_i$   $\checkmark \mathcal{P} \text{ picks } \theta_i \text{ and computes } \theta_{k-1}M_k + \theta_k \hat{M}_k \rightarrow$   $\checkmark \mathcal{V} \text{ picks a challenge } \beta \rightarrow$   $\checkmark \mathcal{P} \text{ solves linear system by determining } s_i \rightarrow$   $\checkmark \mathcal{V} \text{ verifies the linear system}$ 

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# ✓ $\mathcal{V}$ picks a random $\rho$ → ✓ Both compute $\hat{M}_i$ and $\hat{M}_i$ × $\mathcal{P}$ picks $\theta_i$ and computes $\theta_{k-1}M_k + \theta_k\hat{M}_k$ → ✓ $\mathcal{V}$ picks a challenge $\beta$ → ✓ $\mathcal{P}$ solves linear system by determining $s_i$ → × $\mathcal{V}$ verifies the linear system

# ✓ $\mathcal{V}$ picks a random $\rho \rightarrow$ ✓ Both compute $\hat{M}_i$ and $\hat{M}_i$ ✓ $\mathcal{P}$ picks $\theta_i$ and computes $[\theta_{k-1}M_k + \theta_k \hat{M}_k] \rightarrow$ ✓ $\mathcal{V}$ picks a challenge $\beta \rightarrow$ ✓ $\mathcal{P}$ solves linear system by determining $s_i \rightarrow$ ✓ $\mathcal{V}$ verifies the linear system

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 $\ensuremath{\mathcal{V}}$  is supposed to verfy that

$$\beta M_1 + s_1 \hat{M}_1 = \theta_1 \hat{M}_1$$
  
$$s_1 M_2 + s_2 \hat{M}_2 = \theta_1 M_2 + \theta_2 \hat{M}_2$$

$$s_{n-2}M_{n-1} + s_{n-1}\hat{M}_{n-1} = \theta_{n-2}M_{n-2} + \theta_{n-1}\hat{M}_{n-1}$$
$$(-1)^n\beta\hat{M}_n + s_{n-1}M_n = \theta_{n-1}M_n$$

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is satisfied.

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But  $\ensuremath{\mathcal{V}}$  can only see this mess

$$\beta[M_1] + s_1 \hat{M}_1 \neq [\theta_1 \hat{M}_1]$$
  
$$s_1[M_2] + s_2 \hat{M}_2 \neq [\theta_1 M_2 + \theta_2 \hat{M}_2]$$

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$$s_{n-2}[M_{n-1}] + s_{n-1}\hat{M}_{n-1} \neq [\theta_{n-2}M_{n-2} + \theta_{n-1}\hat{M}_{n-1}]$$
  
(-1)<sup>n</sup> $\beta\hat{M}_n + s_{n-1}[M_n] \neq [\theta_{n-1}M_n]$ 

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$$s_1[M_2] + s_2 \hat{M}_2 \neq [\theta_1 M_2 + \theta_2 \hat{M}_2]$$

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$$s_1[M_2] + s_2[\hat{M}_2] 
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 $[\hat{M}_2] = \hat{M}_2$  trivial commitment (not hiding).

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$$s_1[M_2] + s_2[\hat{M}_2] \neq [\theta_1 M_2 + \theta_2 \hat{M}_2]$$

 $[\hat{M}_2] = \hat{M}_2$  trivial commitment (not hiding). Use ZKPOK to show that the commitments

$$[M_2], [\hat{M}_2], [\theta_1 M_2 + \theta_2 \hat{M}_2]$$

are such that

$$s_1M_2 + s_2\hat{M}_2 = \theta_1M_2 + \theta_2\hat{M}_2$$

where  $s_1, s_2$  are known to  $\mathcal{V}$ .

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
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where  $s_1, s_2$  are known to  $\mathcal{V}$ .

This is exactly the equation  $\mathcal{V}$  wants to verify!

# ✓ $\mathcal{V}$ picks a random $\rho \rightarrow \mathcal{P}$ ✓ Both compute $\hat{M}_i = \hat{m}_i - \rho$ , $\mathcal{P}$ computes $M_i = m_i - \rho$ ✓ $\mathcal{P}$ picks $\theta_i$ and computes $[\theta_{k-1}M_k + \theta_k \hat{M}_k] \rightarrow \mathcal{V}$ ✓ $\mathcal{V}$ picks a challenge $\beta \rightarrow \mathcal{P}$ ✓ $\mathcal{P}$ solves linear system by determining $s_i \rightarrow \mathcal{V}$ ✓ $\mathcal{V}$ verifies the linear system *using ZKPOK* for each equation

# Conclusion and Additional Work



- Proof of shuffling using commitments
- Verifiable encryption of (m, r)
- Multiple intermediate servers  $S_i$